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The Canada-China bilateral investment treaty (BIT) – ratified by Canada on 
September 12, 2014, after a two-year delay following its signature in 2012 – provides 
a useful reference for future investment negotiations involving Canada or China and 
other countries.  
 
To China’s advantage, the BIT is especially remarkable for its non-reciprocal 
elements. These elements go beyond the usual non-reciprocity of BITs between 
capital-exporting and capital-importing states because the Canada-China BIT reflects 
a formal non-reciprocity in the terms of the treaty, as well as effective non-
reciprocity. This raises the question of whether other states, especially the United 
States (US) and the European Union (EU), would agree to similar concessions with 
China. 
 
First, the Canada-China BIT allows a right of market access by Chinese investors to 
Canada, but not vice versa. Unlike any other investment treaty concluded by Canada, 
this BIT provides for most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment, but not national 
treatment, at the pre-establishment stage of investment. Since Canada has given pre-
establishment national treatment rights to foreign investors from third countries in 
other BITs, while China has not, the MFN clause in the Canada-China BIT will 
extend the rights enjoyed by these third-country investors in Canada to Chinese 
investors. Yet, Canadian investors will obtain such rights in China only if – and it is a 
big if – they are given by China to third-country investors in a future BIT.  
 
Hence, it was inaccurate for Armand de Mestral to conclude in a recent Perspective 
that “the BIT affords scant protection to the pre-investment phase of foreign 
investment” and that “no right of establishment is provided.”1 These statements are 
only true for Canadian investors in China, not for Chinese investors in Canada. 
 
Second, the BIT is also non-reciprocal due to the relatively extensive liberalization 
and transparency of the Canadian economy as compared to the Chinese economy. 
This is because the BIT excludes from its post-establishment national treatment 
obligation any existing measure (including any “law, regulation, rule, procedure, 
decision, requirement, administrative action, or practice”) of either country that 
 2 
discriminates against the other’s investors, effectively locking in the resulting non-
level playing field between the two countries. 
 
In light of this, assertions by Canadian proponents of the BIT that it will give robust 
protection to Canadian investors are questionable. How difficult will it be for a 
Chinese authority, at any level, to pressure or punish a Canadian investor by requiring 
the investor to comply with a discriminatory requirement or practice that existed at 
the time the BIT entered into force? 
 
Third, the BIT has a broader carve-out for investment screening decisions by China 
than by Canada. Canada’s carve-out is limited to decisions under a federal statute, the 
Investment Canada Act. On the other hand, China’s carve-out covers any of its 
“Laws, Regulations and Rules relating to the regulation of foreign investment.” By 
implication, the treaty allows China at any level of government to block Canadian 
investments, while limiting Canada’s screening powers to those of the federal 
government and to monetary thresholds and other limitations under the Investment 
Canada Act. Thus, even if Canadian investors one day obtained a right of 
establishment in China – e.g., by piggybacking on a future treaty between China and 
the US that incorporated pre-establishment national treatment – China would still 
retain broad powers to reject Canadian investments. 
 
Fourth, the Canada-China BIT departs from Canada’s usual treaty practice – which 
largely tracks the US model and current European approach – in other important 
ways: 
 
 It scales back Canada’s and the other NAFTA states’ position on transparency in 
investor-state arbitration. In particular, the treaty allows either government to 
settle an investor lawsuit without public knowledge after it is filed, but before an 
award is issued. 
 
 It allows a complex “reach-back” on MFN treatment that undermines the 
reliability of language in the BIT aimed at preserving regulatory flexibility. 
 
 It omits reservations to the BIT’s obligations on performance requirements, 
including a reservation for preferential treatment of aboriginal peoples that is 
found in all of Canada’s other relevant treaties – a deplorable concession, given 
the lack of economic opportunities and poor living conditions of Canada’s 
aboriginal population. 
 
 It has a minimum lifespan of 31 years, including a 16-year effective minimum 
term and a 15-year survival clause for existing investments at the time of 
termination. Most of Canada’s BITs can be terminated on one year’s notice, with 
no minimum term, plus a 10 to 20-year survival clause. 
 
Will other states accept these elements in a BIT, or will China move fully to the US or 
EU model? The Canada-China BIT signifies China’s willingness to accept some 
elements of the latter, and highlights areas in which the US or EU could sacrifice 
significant concerns.  
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As for the Canada-China BIT, beyond concerns about flaws in investor-state 
arbitration, there were clear reasons for Canada to reject this treaty on its terms. Its 
quiet ratification by Canada’s federal Cabinet leaves the question: what would justify 
Canada agreeing to a deal that is formally and effectively non-reciprocal? Is it 
remotely possible that the US or the EU would do the same? 
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